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From Direct “Public Use” to Indirect “Public Benefit”:
Kelo v. New London’s Bridge from Rational Basis to
Heightened Scrutiny for Eminent Domain Takings
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 1 Implied
in these words is the sovereign’s eminent domain power: the federal,
state, or local government’s power to take private property for public
use. Since the Supreme Court’s decision extending the scope of the
federal and state governments’ eminent domain power in Kelo v. City of
New London, 2 the most commonly-asked question has been, “So, could
Wal-Mart really take my house now?” 3
Such concern might be justifiable. Within hours of the Court’s
decision in Kelo, the city of Freeport, Texas moved to seize several
“waterfront properties from shrimp processing companies to build a
marina development.” 4 Two days after the decision, city officials in
Boston began like proceedings to seize similar waterfront properties. 5
Nationwide reaction to stem the public outcry since the Court’s
landmark decision has been quick and decisive. During the time between
the Court’s decision on June 23, 2005, and publication of this Note, at
least twenty-five state legislatures have introduced, or pledged to

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Whether framing the issue in this manner should be considered sensationalism, sarcasm,
or simply a scare tactic, it is becoming the rallying cry for those opposed to this decision. See, e.g.,
Megan Barnett, A Homeowner’s Battle: The Supreme Court Will Hear a Case on the Scope of
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.,
Feb.
2,
2005,
Eminent
Domain,
U.S.
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/050228/28domain.htm; Carol Lloyd, Your Casa is
Wal-Mart’s Casa: Invocation of Eminent Domain by Cities To Seize Property for Private
Development is on the Rise, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2005/02/25/carollloyd.DTL.
4. Les Christie, Taking Your Home Away: The Supreme Court Has Ruled that New London
Could Take Homes Away from Their Owners. What Next?, CNN/MONEY, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/25/real_estate/investment_prop/eminent_domain
_v_deveopment.
5. Id.
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introduce, legislation to clarify and/or restrict the power of eminent
domain. 6 Contending that the “Supreme Court has undermined a pillar of
American society—the sanctity of the home,” the United States House of
Representatives overwhelmingly approved a bill to block future seizures
of private property for use by developers. 7 The 5-4 decision in Kelo was
so contentious that the CEO of Freestar Media, LLC faxed an apparently
serious request to the town of Weare, Connecticut to begin the
application process to condemn the land and build a hotel on the present
location of Justice David Souter’s home, reasoning that the hotel would
obviously create a substantially larger tax base for the community. 8
Others targeted Justice Breyer’s vacation home in Connecticut for
condemnation and use as a state park. 9 Both justices voted with the Kelo
majority. 10
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
government from taking private property except for “public use.” 11 The
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment has traditionally limited the
reach of eminent domain to takings with a “justifying public purpose.” 12
However, Kelo was not a case concerning the use of eminent domain for
a traditional use such as a road or public building; nor did it concern the
use of eminent domain to transfer property to common carriers, such as
railroads and hospitals, that make the property available to the public.
Although closer, Kelo was also not concerned with the public benefits
resulting from removal of blight or the opening of market forces. 13
Rather, Kelo presented a vital constitutional question the Supreme Court

6. Id.; see also Associated Press, States Try to Blunt Property Ruling, July 19, 2005,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162979,00.html.
7. See Associated Press, House Bill Counters Eminent Domain Ruling, Nov. 4, 2005,
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/04/eminent.domain.ap/
index.html. The bill, which passed by a vote of 376 to 38, would withhold “for two years all federal
economic development funds to states and localities that use economic development as a rationale
for property seizures. It also would bar the federal government from using eminent domain powers
for economic development.” Id.
8. Michael Tippett, Private Property Activists Want Judge’s House Given to Developers,
NOWPUBLIC, June 28, 2005, http://www.nowpublic.com/node/12631. Anyone desiring to contribute
money to the development plan and actual construction of the hotel may visit
http://www.freestarmedia.com/hotellostliberty2.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2005).
9. Associated Press, Supreme Court Won’t Revisit Eminent Domain Case, Aug. 22, 2005,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166421,00.html.
10. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2655 (2005).
11. U.S. CONST. amend V.
12. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
13. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229.
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had never before addressed: whether the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment authorizes the exercise of eminent domain solely for
economic development. 14 The Court held that it does. 15 Because the
economic development was intended to provide a larger tax base and
create additional jobs in an area burdened with a severe economic
depression, the Court ruled that these public benefits, although indirect,
were correctly categorized by the legislature as a public use. 16
Courts have traditionally given deference to legislative judgments of
what public needs justify the use of the takings power when the public
benefit is clearly discernible from the taking. 17 The confusion in the
lower courts arises from takings that do not directly achieve the
government’s purpose—takings that involve a separate, unregulated
private party to whom the property flows. In such a taking, the public
benefit is realized only if and after the separate private party benefits
from the property. 18 When a taking cannot be said to directly achieve the
government’s objective, it thus becomes more problematic for the
judiciary to rely on and defer to the legislature’s judgment about whether
the benefit could rationally accrue; there must be deeper analysis into the
government’s design, plan, and implementation to ensure that the
property of the private owner on the losing end of the taking is not taken
in vain.
These two very different scenarios—takings that either directly or
indirectly achieve a public benefit—have thus far been jumbled together
by a common deferential standard of review until the lower courts are
completely unable to settle on any appropriate test to decide their
outcome. In reality, these two very different takings stand at opposite
ends of a chasm separated only by a legislature’s ability to see direct
benefits to the public on the one hand, and divine potential indirect
benefits flowing through a private third party on the other.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo expands and conflates the
government’s eminent domain powers until private use and public use
14. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
15. Id. at 2669.
16. Id. at 2660.
17. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (upholding the data-sharing
provisions at issue because the “most direct beneficiaries” were the subsequent pesticide applicants
(emphasis added)).
18. See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229 (allowing takings under the Public Use Clause that
could only benefit the general public after benefiting individual lessees); Berman, 348 U.S. at 26
(allowing takings that could only benefit the general public after private firms had finished
developing the area).
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become virtually a compound in one. This Note argues that while
legislatures should be allowed deference under a rational basis standard
to declare takings for a public use in situations where public benefits are
directly achieved, they should only be able to claim that takings resulting
in indirect benefits to the public are for a “public use” after withstanding
a heightened scrutiny of the legislature’s purpose and plan in the taking.
In other words, when the government uses the eminent domain power to
achieve an indirect public benefit such as economic redevelopment,
courts should apply a higher standard of scrutiny in determining whether
the taking is a “public use,” thereby spanning the theoretical chasm
between takings with direct benefits and takings with indirect benefits
(over the New London Bridge, if you will). This test would require the
government to show that there is a nexus between the nature of the need
for the taking and the scope of the proposed solution—a standard already
well-established under regulatory takings. 19
Part II of this Note provides an overview of takings jurisprudence,
discussing categories of eminent domain takings that result in purely
direct public benefit and those that result in indirect public benefit. Part
III briefly outlines the factual and procedural background of the issues
raised in Kelo. Part IV critically analyzes the reasoning employed by the
Kelo majority as well as the dissenting arguments in both the Supreme
Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court. It concludes that both courts
erred in holding that mere rational basis review is appropriate for a
legislature’s determination of a public use and that courts have a
responsibility, when the proposed public benefit can be achieved only
indirectly, to apply a heightened review to the government’s plan in
order to ensure that the taking is for a public use as the Fifth Amendment
guarantees. In applying this heightened scrutiny, courts must determine
whether the purpose for the taking will be appropriately accomplished
through the scope of the solution and to what degree the taking will
achieve its purpose. Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should
have overruled the Connecticut Supreme Court and used Kelo to
establish a higher level of scrutiny for takings resulting in indirect public
benefits, namely takings for economic development.

19. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
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II. BACKGROUND

Alexander Hamilton described “[t]he security of Property” to the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 as one of the “great obj[ects] of
Gov[ernment].” 20 The Kelo Court weakened the security of property by
applying rational basis review to a state legislature’s determination that
economic development, with only indirect benefits to the public, was a
public use. To fully understand the Kelo decision, it is necessary to
analyze the development of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the
Takings Clause in general with specific emphasis given to the
development of the Public Use Clause. Following this historical analysis
is a discussion of how the distinction between a public and a private use
of property is applied to determine if a taking is for a public use. Section
B outlines the three general categories of takings that comply with the
public use requirement and how the Court has used these categories in
cases that deal both with takings that directly result in public benefits and
takings that indirectly result in public benefits. Section C then briefly
compares the rational basis standard applied in those three categories
with the potential outcome under a higher standard of review.
A. Takings Clause and Public Use Clause Analysis
Before the Kelo decision brought the spotlight to this area of law,
eminent domain takings had already been a growing nationwide
controversy. A recent study documented that between 1998 and 2002,
there were over 10,000 filed or threatened condemnations that involved
transfers of private property to other private parties in forty-one states. 21
News reports throughout the country also documented takings of homes
and businesses for use by other private parties, including developers and
big-box retail stores. 22 Such condemnations, occurring even before the
20. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966), quoted in Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
21. DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/index.shtml. The study only documented cases available from
public sources. Because many private condemnations go unreported in public sources, the actual
number of private-to-private eminent domain cases is most likely much higher than the confirmed
numbers of the study.
22. See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of ‘Public Use,’ USA TODAY, Apr. 1,
2004, at A03; Jason George, Testing the Boundary Lines of Eminent Domain; Long Branch Wants to
Seize Old Homes to Make Room for New Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004; Dean Starkman,
Tracking the Abuse of Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2003; Ira Carnahan, Domain Game,
Nov.
25,
2002,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/
FORBES,
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Court considered Kelo’s drastic expansion of eminent domain power,
“unquestionably blurr[ed] the distinction between public purpose and
private benefit and . . . raise[ed] the specter that the power will be used to
favor purely private interests.” 23 Kelo affirmed the fear that private-toprivate takings for purely economic gain are valid.
That government may not take private land and give it to another
private individual is a long-standing principle of constitutional
jurisprudence. 24 Over two centuries ago, shortly after ratification of the
Bill of Rights, Justice Chase wrote:
An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful
exercise of legislative authority. . . . A few instances will suffice to
explain what I mean. . . . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives
it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a
Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it. 25

However, eminent domain is the power to do just that: take private
property and transfer it to another for public use. The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was meant to recognize this power and to identify
restrictions on its exercise for the protection of private property rights. 26
1. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” 27 The power to take
property is one of the most threatening powers a government has at its
disposal. As early as 1795, the Court described eminent domain as “the
despotic power.” 28

1125/112_print.html; Stephen Humphries, The Uninvited Bulldozer Grass-Roots, Rebellion
Challenges Rule of Eminent Domain as Local Governments Take Private Land and Sell It to Private
Interests, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 26, 2001.
23. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 575 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
24. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, “Public Use,” and the Conundrum of
Original Intent, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 61 (1996).
25. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted), quoted in Kelo, 125
S. Ct. at 2662 n.5.
26. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
258–59 (Thompson-West 2004).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 312 (1795).
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However, the power of eminent domain is not just the power to
destroy. Eminent domain serves an important function in allowing state
and local governments to take measures to “revitaliz[e] local economies,
creat[e] much-needed jobs, and generat[e] revenue that enables cities to
provide essential services.” 29 Those governments exercising this
condemnation power understand that it must be used “prudently.” 30
Thus, the question is not whether the power should be allowed, but under
what conditions the exercise of this power will be allowed. 31
The text of the Fifth Amendment “confirms the State’s authority to
confiscate private property . . . [but] imposes two conditions on the
exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a public use and just
compensation must be paid to the owner” 32 for the taking. The just
compensation requirement spreads the cost of the taking, thereby
“prevent[ing] the public from loading upon one individual more than his
just share of the burdens of government.” 33 However, the key limitation
on the government’s ability to confiscate private property is the phrase
“for public use.” 34 “The public use requirement . . . imposes a more basic
limitation, circumscribing the very scope of the eminent domain power:
Government may compel an individual to forfeit her property for the
public’s use, but not for the benefit of another private person.” 35 This

29. Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 1,
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166931.
30. See id.
31. For example, there is a difference between eminent domain takings, in which the
government declares that it is taking property, and regulatory takings, in which the government uses
regulation of property to effectuate the equivalent of a taking. The theory of regulatory takings
recognizes that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent [by the government],
if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). An entire subsection of takings jurisprudence revolves around the circumstances under and
the degree to which the government may regulate property without effectuating a taking requiring a
public use and just compensation. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a statute permitting a permanent physical invasion of property,
although small, requires just compensation and a public use); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (defining the balancing factors to determine if a government regulation
classifies as a taking requiring just compensation and a public use).
32. Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
34. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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requirement promotes fairness and justice. 36 The question then becomes
where to draw the line between a public use and a private use.
2. Private vs. public use and the standard to apply
The distinction between a private or public use revolves around
whom the government is trying to “advantage.” 37 In regards to Takings
Clause analysis, a purely private use taking is never permitted and is
typically viewed as “impermissible favoritism” to a private party. 38 To
that end, any taking designed “to favor a particular private party, with
only incidental or pretextual public benefits,” would violate the public
use requirement of the Takings Clause and would therefore be a private
use. 39 Thus, a taking is either for a public use, or it is unconstitutional.
Whereas early on the Public Use Clause was satisfied when
exercised for “the public good, the public necessity or the public
utility,” 40 the Court has broadened that definition through its modern
interpretations of the clause. 41 Through application of a very deferential
standard of review, the Court has merely deferred to the legislature’s
classification of a public use, rather than define the distinction between
public and private. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 42 the
Supreme Court reemphasized its earlier decision in Berman v. Parker 43
that judicial deference is owed to legislative determinations of public
use. In Midkiff, the Court stated that the courts’ role “in reviewing a
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use . . . is . . .
extremely narrow.” 44 The Court emphasized that this deference applies
36. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336
(2002) (“The concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ . . . underlie the Takings Clause.” (quoting Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
37. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2669. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. Rather than discussing appropriate uses of private property, which would be a much
more lengthy discussion—and inevitably lead to an analysis of the Court’s recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime
for two persons of the same sex to engage in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy of a home)—
the phrase “private use” for purposes of Takings Clause analysis refers only to the purpose for the
taking, i.e. who is the legislature attempting to advantage, a private party or the general public, by
taking property from its current owners?
40. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, at 286–87.
41. Id. at 287–88 (referencing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Haw. Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
42. 467 U.S. at 242.
43. 348 U.S. at 31–33.
44. 467 U.S. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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equally to determinations made by both Congress and the state
legislatures. 45 The federal and local governments are presumed to have
the ability to take private property as a function of the “principle of
consent inherent in a representative government.” 46 Legislatures are
further assumed more capable of such decisions than the courts because,
as the Supreme Court noted, “in our system of government, legislatures
are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an
exercise of the taking power.” 47
This point is key in analyzing the propriety of applying mere rational
basis scrutiny to a legislature’s determination of a public use, as was the
case in Kelo. In order to indicate the appropriate level of judicial
deference to the legislature, and the degree of carefulness the legislature
should expect of itself, the Court will apply a standard of review to
assess the constitutionality of a law or state action at issue. 48 That
standard will be a point somewhere on the spectrum from minimum
rationality to per se prohibition. 49 In analyzing the constitutionality of
takings, the Court has traditionally applied the most deferential standard
of review, rational basis review. The germane question is whether that
deference is merited in cases where the benefit to the public will only be
indirectly achieved by the taking. Is such a case then a true public use, or
could the taking be classified as a private use since the land being taken
will be given to other private parties, and therefore be unconstitutional?
Hence, while the academic distinction between private and public
use is instructive, the decision as to who makes the distinction is critical.
Who has the final say on whether the future advantage of a taking will
benefit the public sufficient to be classified as a public use to satisfy the
Takings Clause, the legislature or the court? Applying a deferential
standard of review will typically leave the decision to Congress and state
legislatures without any room for review by the judiciary; however, a
higher standard would give the courts a larger role in determining
whether a taking proposed by a legislature or Congress really is for a
public use sufficient to pass constitutional muster.

45. Id.
46. Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
“Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1247 (2002).
47. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
48. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916 (2004).
49. Id.
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However, rather than clearly defining the distinction between private
and public uses and the standard that will apply, the Court has
established “three categories of takings that comply with the public use
requirement.” 50 Having established that only public use takings will be
constitutional, these categories—public ownership takings, use-by-thepublic takings, and public purpose takings—demonstrate the Court’s
takings jurisprudence as it developed from cases in which eminent
domain takings would directly result in a benefit to the public to those
takings that would only indirectly achieve a public benefit.
B. From Cases Involving Direct Public Benefits
to Indirect Public Benefits
Although the direct or indirect nature of the public benefits
accomplished by a taking was never explicitly a factor in the Court’s
determination of constitutionality for any of the three categories, this
Note later argues that it should be. 51 Since these three public use
categories span the spectrum between achieving direct benefits and
indirect public benefits to the public, and since it is more difficult to
conclude that indirect public benefits will ultimately benefit the public,
the following background helps illustrate why the standard of review
used in the respective category should rise to correspond with the
increasingly indirect nature of the public benefits achieved in that
category.
1. Public ownership takings—direct public benefit
First, public ownership takings are commonly classified as a public
use taking and afforded rational basis scrutiny by the judiciary because
the benefits to the public are directly achieved. The “sovereign may
transfer private property to public ownership—such as for a road, a
hospital, or a military base.” 52 The resulting benefits of a public
ownership taking are immediate, clearly discernible, and provided
directly to the public because, regardless of whether the ownership
translates into a literal benefit to the public, theoretically the public
immediately benefits from the government’s ownership of the property
taken.

50. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
51. See infra Part IV.A.
52. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Early American courts uniformly recognized that government takes
property for a public use when it retains ownership of the property. For
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld appropriations by the
highway commissioners of a military training field—land already owned
by the public. 53 The court explained that when the owners of the land
granted it to the town of Cambridge in 1769, the townspeople “became
owners of the soil with full power, as such owners, to make any use of
the property, which owners of land can make.” 54 The U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed such reasoning in Kohl v. United States, 55 approving
takings “for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and lighthouses, for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other
public uses.” 56
Furthermore, Justice Holmes recognized that land taken during WWI
for construction and improvement of buildings for “military purposes . . .
clearly [was] for a public use” since the buildings facilitated national
security during a time of war. 57 Similarly, land taken for the construction
of a road was an asset of, and belonged to, the community at large, even
though the road was not widely used. 58
In all of these examples the eminent domain power was used and the
public directly benefited from the result because the public—in other
words, the people through their government—actually owned the land.
Therefore, rather than the public benefiting from the incidental effects of
the land use, the taking ensured that the public benefit was directly
achieved through the taking, even if that direct benefit was at times
theoretical.
2. Use-by-the-public takings—direct public benefit
Second, the “sovereign may transfer private property to private
parties, often common carriers, 59 who make the property available for
53. In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834).
54. Id. at 99.
55. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
56. Id. at 371.
57. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
58. See generally Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 706 (1923) (noting “[t]hat a
taking of property for a highway is a taking for public use has been universally recognized, from
time immemorial”).
59. A common carrier is a person or company whose business is transportation of people or
property. For example, Amtrak is a common carrier because it transports people by train, and
Federal Express is a common carrier because it ships packages. When persons pay the carrier’s rate,
they cannot be refused service arbitrarily.
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the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a
stadium.” 60 Even though the property is transferred to a private party in
such takings, the government still maintains regulatory control of the
property sufficient to ensure complete and open access to the public,
thereby ensuring that the taking directly achieves a public benefit. Courts
recognized early on that limited circumstances exist in which
governments could take private property and give it to private owners—
most often common carriers with a duty of access to the public. The
public’s right of access ensures that the public “uses” the property even
though a private person or organization owns the property.
This category is best explained in Beekman v. Saratoga &
Schenectady Railroad Co., 61 wherein the court upheld the use of eminent
domain for the construction of a private railroad. 62 As the beneficiary of
a government taking, and as an entity providing a service normally
provided by the government, the railroad owed the public a duty of
nondiscrimination, and it was subject to utility-rate regulation:
The public have an interest in the use of the road, and the owners of the
franchise are liable to respond in damages, if they refuse to transport an
individual or his property upon such road, without any reasonable
excuse, upon being paid the usual rate of fare.
The legislature may regulate the use of the franchise and limit the
amount of the tolls . . . . 63

Since these takings directly achieve a public benefit, the Court has
applied this same deferential standard of review, termed “rational basis,”
and has come to the same conclusion regarding public utilities.
According to the Court, the purpose of a power company, for example, is
to manufacture, supply, and sell to the public, power produced by water
as a motive force. . . . [T]o gather the streams from waste and to draw
from them energy, labor without brains, and so to save mankind from
toil that it can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very
foundation of all our achievements and all our welfare. If that purpose
is not public, we should be at a loss to say what is. 64

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1916).
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Even though the actual new owner of the plant was a private company,
the government could still take the land notwithstanding the public use
requirement because the purpose and operations of the plant would be of
beneficial use to the public, and the government would maintain
regulatory control of the plant to ensure the public’s access to its
product. 65
Taking land and giving it to a railroad or utility company directly
achieved significant public benefits. The public benefit did not flow from
a benefit that a private individual or organization received and then
passed on to the public—it was direct. Therefore, because the benefit
was direct, courts have deferred to legislative judgment and applied only
rational basis review in determining whether a public use existed.
3. Public purpose takings—indirect public benefit
Finally, the Supreme Court has “allowed that, under certain
circumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public
purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for
subsequent private use.” 66 Takings that serve a public purpose take
private property and give it to different private ownership free of any
government regulation or claim of public ownership—a facial violation
of the Public Use Clause. However, the circumstances of each case merit
the taking in order to achieve a specific public benefit otherwise
unattainable. The two seminal cases in this area are Berman v. Parker 67
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 68
a. Berman v. Parker—condemnation of blight. In Berman, the Court
upheld takings within a blighted area of Washington D.C. The
neighborhood had deteriorated to the point that 64.3% of its dwellings
were beyond repair. 69 It was overcome with “overcrowding of
dwellings,” “lack of adequate streets and alleys,” and “lack of light and
air.” 70 Congress determined that the neighborhood was “injurious to the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare” and that it was necessary to
“eliminate[e] all such injurious conditions by employing all means

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 34.
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necessary and appropriate for the purpose,” including eminent domain. 71
“Under [Congress’s] plan, the area would be condemned and part of it
utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public
facilities.” 72 “The remainder of the land would be leased or sold to
private parties for the purpose of redevelopment, including the
construction of low-cost housing.” 73 Thus, the justifying public purpose
was to rid the city of the blighted neighborhood, thereby increasing the
safety and health of the neighborhood and surrounding areas.
The owner of a department store located in the area, Mr. Berman,
challenged the condemnation, pointing out that his store was not itself
blighted and argued that the creation of a “better balanced, more
attractive community” was not a valid public use. 74 A unanimous Court
unequivocally affirmed the public use underlying the taking:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is
not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the
present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 75

The eventual success of the taking rested on the ability of private
third parties to fulfill their obligations to build a neighborhood better
than the blight they were destroying. The public would benefit only at
the conclusion of the private developers’ efforts. The developers
obviously benefited from their work on the project; if they did not
benefit, the project would come to a standstill and no one would benefit.
Thus, only if and after the private party benefited could the public
receive any benefit.
b. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff—oligopoly busting. In
71. Id. at 28.
72. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 31).
73. Id.
74. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
75. Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Midkiff, the Court upheld a land condemnation scheme in Hawaii
whereby title in real property was taken from lessors and transferred to
lessees. At the time, the state and federal governments owned forty-nine
percent of Hawaii’s land while seventy-two private landowners owned
another forty-seven percent of the land. 76 Land ownership was so
concentrated that on the state’s most urbanized island, Oahu, twenty-two
landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. 77 The Hawaii
Legislature found the oligopoly in land ownership was “skewing the
State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring
the public tranquility and welfare,” and therefore enacted a
condemnation scheme for redistributing title. 78 After the appropriate
requirements under the scheme were met, tenants on the land could
request that the Hawaii Housing Authority condemn and purchase the
property on which they lived and then sell it to the tenants at the reduced
price. 79 The former tenants would then enjoy full rights of alienability
with the land and could keep the land, rent it out themselves, or sell it. 80
The Court found that the “mere fact that property taken outright by
eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries
does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.” 81
Explaining that the Court had rejected the literal requirement that
condemned property be put to use only for the general public, as in useby-the-public takings, 82 Justice O’Connor made clear that “‘[i]t is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion . .
. directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to
constitute a public use.’” 83
The purpose of the taking in Midkiff was to break the oligopoly of
land ownership and open up the real estate market to competitive market
forces. 84 That benefit, although indirectly achieved, was achieved
through taking land from lessors and transferring it to the lessees. The
new owners, although private parties, had full power of alienation over

76. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 234.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 243–44.
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
84. Id. at 241–42.
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the land, allowing market forces to then work to the eventual benefit of
the public. If the third parties had not acted on their ability to sell and
buy the property, the oligopoly might as well have remained in place.
However, after the former lessees used their power of alienation to break
the oligopoly, competitive forces began to enter the market, and thus the
public reaped the benefit—but only if and after the private third parties
benefited.
C. Berman and Midkiff Under Heightened Scrutiny
The Court has yet to apply a heightened form of scrutiny to a taking
classified by the legislature as a public use. Past determinations of public
use have either survived or been struck down under rational basis alone.
However, not all takings are created equal. As discussed, public use
takings can be classified into three categories. These categories span the
spectrum from takings resulting in direct benefits to the public and
takings resulting in indirect benefits—takings that benefit the public only
if and after a private third party benefits. Part of the Court’s reluctance to
apply a heightened form of scrutiny is that the “legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation.” 85
However, applying a higher form of scrutiny to takings that only
indirectly achieve a public benefit will not supplant the judiciary into the
legislature’s role of deciding social legislation. As this Note will
explain, 86 both Berman and Midkiff would have been upheld under the
heightened scrutiny test proposed herein. This demonstrates the robust
nature of a heightened scrutiny analysis that allows the judiciary to check
the legislature’s determination that the public benefits of a taking are
sufficient for classification as a public use. Berman and Midkiff would be
upheld; however, Kelo would not.
III. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
A. Factual Background
New London is located in southeast Connecticut. The city has been
in economic decline for decades and was declared a “distressed

85. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
86. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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municipality” in 1990. 87 The Fort Trumbull area was particularly hardhit when the Federal Government closed a naval center in 1996, costing
the area 1500 jobs. 88 “In 1998, the [c]ity’s unemployment rate was
nearly double that of the State.” 89 The city leaders, therefore, targeted
this area for redevelopment and revitalization. 90
In January 2000, New London approved a development plan
“projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its
downtown and waterfront areas.” 91 In February 1998, Pfizer Inc.
announced that it would build a $300 million research facility in the Fort
Trumbull area. 92 This development, it was hoped, would serve as a
catalyst and give incentive for other businesses to locate in the area. 93
The city intended to capitalize on the announcement of the Pfizer
facility and “the new commerce it was expected to attract.” 94 Beyond
merely creating jobs and generating tax revenue, “the plan was designed
to make the city more attractive and create leisure and recreational
opportunities on the waterfront and in the park.” 95
The development plan included “a waterfront hotel and conference
center, along with marinas for . . . transient tourist boaters, . . .
commercial fishing vessels, . . . and a public walkway along the
waterfront.” 96 There would be approximately “eighty new residences,
organized into an urban neighborhood and linked by a public walkway to
the remainder of the development plan.” 97 The plan called for “90,000
square feet of high technology research and development office space
and parking” located close to the Pfizer facilities. 98 There would be an
additional “140,000 square feet of office,” parking, and retail space on an
adjacent parcel. 99 Space would even be reserved for the United States
Coast Guard Museum, which was to be moved “from the nearby United
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
Id. at 2658.
Id.
Id. at 2658–59.
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn.2004).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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States Coast Guard Academy.” 100 All of this was calculated to bring a
considerable influx of jobs and tax revenue. 101
However, before development could begin, the city had to assemble
the land needed for the project. The city’s development agency, New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), purchased as much property
as people were willing to sell but was unable to purchase all of the
required property due to unwilling owners. 102 In November 2000, the
city, through the NLDC, initiated condemnation proceedings against
those properties. 103
At the time of the condemnation proceedings, “Susette Kelo [had]
lived in the Fort Trumbell area since 1997.” Since moving there, she
made numerous improvements to her house and rightfully prized its
waterfront view.” 104 “Wilhemina Dery was born in her Fort Trumbell
house in 1918” and had lived there all her life. 105 After marrying her
husband Charles, she continued to live in her home over the next sixty
years. 106 Ultimately, fifteen properties in the Fort Trumbell area, owned
by nine people, became the focus of this condemnation proceeding. 107
The city and the NLDC did not allege that any of these properties were
“blighted or otherwise in poor condition.” 108 Neither the city nor the
NLDC claimed that the land at issue would be owned by the public or
that the use of the land would be regulated to ensure access to the public
subsequent to the taking. The homes were located in a perfect spot on the
waterfront; unfortunately for the residents, the city also considered the
location a perfect spot for redevelopment.
To justify the use of eminent domain, the Supreme Court had to find
that the taking was for a public purpose sufficient to satisfy the Public
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Kelo majority recognized that
the “sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation.” 109 Thus, the City of New London would not be “allowed

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

1686

Id.
Id.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
Id. at 2660.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2661.

5CHRISTENSEN.FIN.DOC

1669]

3/14/2006 5:26:59 PM

Kelo: From Direct “Public Use” to Indirect “Public Benefit”

to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its
actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” 110 However, because the
taking was executed “pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development
plan,” 111 and because neither of the lower courts nor the Supreme Court
found any evidence of an illegitimate purpose, the Court concluded that
the “City’s development plan was not adopted ‘to benefit a particular
class of identifiable individuals.’” 112
Without finding any improper motive on the part of the city to
advantage a particular private entity, which would render the taking a
private use, 113 the Court correctly found that the only remaining question
was whether the development plan “serve[d] a ‘public purpose.’” 114
However, instead of analyzing whether the taking was for a public
purpose, the Court dismissed the issue as only a question of standard of
review. 115 Since the Court has a “longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments in this field,” 116 the simple answer is that the
public purpose is whatever the legislature says it is. “Given the
comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of [its] review,” the Court
found that the “plan unquestionably 117 serves a public purpose, [and
therefore] the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement
of the Fifth Amendment.” 118
Justice Stevens, writing for the Kelo majority, claimed that, “over a
century of our case law interpreting [the Fifth Amendment] dictates an
affirmative answer to [whether the city’s proposed condemnations are for
a ‘public use’].” 119 This, in turn, prevented the Court from reaching any
alternative conclusion. However, earlier Justice Stevens admitted, if only
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2662 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
113. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that any taking designed “to favor a
particular party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,” would violate the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause and would therefore be a private use).
114. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion).
115. Id. The majority opinion noted that “[t]he disposition of this case therefore turns on the
question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’ Without exception, our
cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments in this field.” Id.
116. Id.
117. There is some irony in the Court’s use of the word “unquestionably.” Is it unquestionable
because of its clarity or because the Court simply won’t question the legislature?
118. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 2668.
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briefly, that the reason the entire majority opinion rests on and defends
rational basis review is because “[t]here is . . . no principled way of
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes
that we have recognized.” 120 It is not that a deferential standard of
review is the only way to decide this case, but rather that the Court could
not or would not consider any other possible means of distinguishing
economic development from other already recognized public purposes.
This Note seeks to remedy that lack of imagination.
B. Procedural History
In December 2000, the nine property owners brought an action in the
New London Superior Court. 121 Among other things, they claimed that
taking their properties through eminent domain “would violate the
‘public use’ restriction in the Fifth Amendment.” 122 The trial court, after
a seven-day trial, denied a petition for permanent injunctive relief as to
some of the parcels in question. 123 The court concluded that, among
other things, economic development constitutes a valid public use under
the takings clauses of the state and federal constitutions, and that these
takings would sufficiently benefit the public. 124 However, the court
“granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of [other
properties]” in question because the condemnation of those properties on
adjacent parcels was not “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the
development plan. 125 Both sides appealed and the Connecticut Supreme
Court ruled that all of the city’s proposed takings were valid. 126
The ruling was based in part on a Connecticut General Statute that,
as the Supreme Court noted, expressed a legislative determination that
the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic
development project is a “public use” and in the “public interest.” 127 In
120. Id. at 2665.
121. Id. at 2660.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Kelo v. City of New London 843 A.2d 500, 507–08, 574 (Conn. 2004).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2004).
It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the
continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisition and
improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commercial plants to meet the
needs of industry and business should be in accordance with local, regional and state
planning objectives; that such acquisition and improvement often cannot be accomplished
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accordance with that determination, the Supreme Court further held,
relying on Berman and Midkiff, that such economic development was a
valid public use under both the State and the Federal Constitutions. 128
The three dissenting justices from the Connecticut Supreme Court
argued for a “heightened” standard of judicial review for takings justified
by economic development. They agreed that the plan was intended to
serve a valid public use; however, they would have held all of the takings
unconstitutional because the city had not provided “clear and convincing
evidence” that the plan’s economic benefits would come to fruition.
IV. ANALYSIS: CROSSING THE NEW LONDON BRIDGE
FROM RATIONAL TO HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
FOR EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS
The Court is unable to rely solely on a deferential standard of review
for all declarations of public use for eminent domain takings and retain
its role as a judicial check on legislative power. This is especially true
when dealing with eminent domain cases that do not directly achieve a
public benefit.
Takings that indirectly achieve a public benefit require a higher
standard of scrutiny. Takings that would indirectly benefit the public
(public purpose takings, i.e. for economic development) stand apart from
those that directly achieve a public benefit (public ownership takings,
use-by-the public takings) because of the level of certainty with which
the legislature can ensure the benefit. They should not be considered
under the same standard of review because they are fundamentally
different. With direct benefits to the public, the court ought to continue to
engage in rational basis review since the legislature is better situated to
make decisions of social impact. 129 However, with increasing levels of
uncertainty comes an increasing responsibility by the judiciary to ensure
that private property is not taken without adequate justification.
through the ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and
economies of cost; that permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve
unified land and water areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial
plants for industrial and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend funds
to businesses and industries within a project area in accordance with such planning
objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and
that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this chapter is hereby
declared as a matter of legislative determination.
Id.
128. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527–28.
129. Id.
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A. Getting Beyond the Rational Basis Test
for Takings with Indirect Benefits
Rational basis review is inadequate for economic development
takings because the only outcome citizens are assured of is that private
property will be taken and the state will attempt to put it to use. The
Court had the opportunity in Kelo v. City of New London to establish the
principle that rising levels of uncertainty should be accompanied by a
rising level of scrutiny. The irony in the Court’s reluctance to adopt a
higher standard for cases of indirect public benefit is that a test by which
to gauge whether the taking will substantially advance the government’s
purpose already exists in the Court’s takings jurisprudence—not in
eminent domain but in regulatory takings precedent.
The following sections outline the Kelo majority’s arguments for a
continued reliance on rational basis scrutiny and why those justifications
are inadequate in cases of takings that would indirectly achieve a public
benefit. The Court concluded that as long as conceivable reasons for a
state action exist, that action should be upheld under a rational review;
and in the alternative, the state may proceed regardless because the state
may act under its police power to ensure the benefit of its citizens.
However, neither conceivable reasons for a taking nor the state’s police
power provide the necessary authority for the Court to abdicate
responsibility to ensure that the legislature’s determination of a public
use will indeed produce concrete benefits for the public when that benefit
is not clear from the outset. Furthermore, the Court’s indiscriminate use
of rational basis review for takings has produced significant
inconsistencies between the Court’s takings jurisprudence and its
precedents in other areas, as well as between the federal and state courts,
and between different state courts.
1. “Conceivable” reasons
The Court incorrectly upheld the Connecticut legislature’s
determination that economic development was a public use when it
deemed it “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” 130 Courts
have generally upheld takings where they could conceive of any reason
why the legislature might have thought the takings necessary. For
example, in Berman and Midkiff, the takings were challenged on the
basis that taking private property and giving it to private organizations is
130. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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not a “public use.” 131 However, in those decisions, the Court emphasized
the “importance of deferring to legislative judgments about [what
constitutes a] public purpose.” 132
Earlier Court precedent even did the legislature’s job of conceiving
potential reasons. 133 The Court opined that it was sufficient that there
were several conceivable reasons why the state legislature might have
enacted the law in question, and therefore, there was no need for an
actual legitimate motivation. 134
However, despite the overemphasis on deference to the legislature,
Berman and Midkiff emphasized an important principle of the public use
clause: “A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the
public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of
government and would thus be void.” 135 The Court has repeatedly
concluded that “one person’s property may not be taken for the benefit of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid.” 136 To protect that principle, those decisions
reserved “a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature’s judgment
of
what
constitutes
a
public
use
. . . [though] the Court in Berman made clear that it is ‘an extremely
131. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
31 (1954).
132. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
[O]ur inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge the
effectiveness of legislation. When considering the Fifth Amendment issues presented
by Hawaii’s Land Reform Act, we noted that the Act, “like any other, may not be
successful in achieving its intended goals. But ‘whether in fact the provisions will
accomplish the objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is
satisfied if . . . the . . . [State] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act]
would promote its objective.’”
Id. at 511 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
133. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (providing reasons not
expressly stated by the legislature for why the Oklahoma legislature might have enacted a law
forbidding opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an
ophthalmologist or optometrist).
134. Id. The Court reasoned that the “Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful
requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement.” Id. at 487.
135. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
136. Id. at 241 (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55,
80 (1937)); see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (“The taking by a state
of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner’s consent, for the private use
of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the fourteenth article of amendment of the
constitution of the United States.”).
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narrow’ one.” 137 In takings for indirect public benefits, that role should
be expanded to pierce past any merely conceivable purposes to find the
justifying purpose.
Ironically, the eminent domain power is not exercised for
conceivable purposes. The eminent domain power is always exercised to
advance specific purposes, such as a road, a hospital, economic
development. In fact, the established rules governing forced takings of
private property universally require an ex ante statement of the “ends”
justifying the condemnation. 138 In most states, and for all takings by the
federal government, eminent domain is a judicial proceeding. 139 After
satisfying the prerequisites, the condemning entity files an action against
the persons whose property it seeks to take. 140 The condemning entity
must submit pleadings that, among other things, describe the land to be
taken and, most importantly, set forth the public use for which it is being
taken. 141
The fact that the government must already justify every exercise of
eminent domain with an ex ante statement of purpose undermines
Midkiff’s dictum that deference to the dictates of the political branches
requires courts to speculate about conceivable justifications for an
exercise of eminent domain. 142 Furthermore, the Court has held that such
speculation is unnecessary when the government has already articulated
its purpose. 143 For example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission, 144 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to a
county’s practice of only reassessing property for tax purposes when title
changed hands. The Court invalidated the scheme because similarly
situated property owners bore drastically different tax burdens. 145 Three
137. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240, (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
138. 6 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.05[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2004).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. § 26A.02[1] (quoting state statutes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(c)(2) (directing that
“the complaint [for condemnation of property] shall contain a short and plain statement of . . . the
use for which the property is to be taken”).
142. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (citations omitted) (“Of course, this Act, like any other, may
not be successful in achieving its intended goals. But ‘whether in fact the provision will accomplish
its objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . . [state]
Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.’” (quoting W.
& S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981))); see also Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979).
143. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).
144. 488 U.S. 336 (1989)
145. Id. at 341, 343.
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years later, in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 146 the Court upheld California’s
Proposition 13, which had a nearly identical effect as the scheme in
Allegheny. 147
In distinguishing the cases, the Court relied upon the fact that the
county in Allegheny had asserted that its assessment scheme was
“rationally related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current
value.” 148 The Court then implied that, when the government articulates
a purpose for its action, it will be held to it:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of
rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker
actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
classification . . . . [But] this Court’s review does require that a purpose
may conceivably or “may reasonably have been the [decisionmaker’s]
purpose and policy.” 149

Although not required to, when the legislature states its purpose for a
taking certain action, they are held to that purpose. Since the process of
condemning property for eminent domain takings requires a legislature
to state the purpose for the taking, the Court ought not to rely or search
after “conceivable reasons” in order to apply a deferential rational basis
standard of.
2. The police power is not synonymous with eminent domain
The concept of the state’s police power must be divorced from the
eminent domain power in order for the Court to properly analyze
legislative uses of eminent domain. A factor in the Court’s insistence on
rational basis scrutiny for “public use” claims, as Justice Thomas points
out in his Kelo dissent, is its erroneous equation of the eminent domain
power with the state’s police power. 150 This application of rational basis
has been justified by the Court’s conclusion that the eminent domain
power “is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police
powers.” 151 The Court has further held that if something is “within the
146. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
147. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 336–37.
148. Id. at 343.
149. Nordinger, 505 U.S. at 15 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
528–29 (1959)).
150. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2685 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); see also Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 31 (1954) (“We deal, in other words, with what has traditionally been known as the police
power.”).
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authority of [a legislature through the police power], the means by which
it will be attained is also for Congress to determine.” 152 In other words,
once something is within the police power of the state, it is automatically
afforded rational basis scrutiny. The Court concluded that an exercise of
eminent domain is merely one possible means to achieve the entire range
of permissible governmental ends and should be afforded rational basis
scrutiny as part and parcel of the police power. 153
This conclusion is flawed and should not be validation for the
exclusive use of rational basis review for any and all eminent domain
cases. First, there is widespread agreement across academia that the
Public Use Clause was intended to limit the range of acceptable “ends”
achievable through an exercise of eminent domain. 154 The assertion that
eminent domain power and police powers are coterminous is illogical.
As Professor Merrill observed,
This pronouncement has dismayed commentators because the outer
limit of the police power has traditionally marked the line between
noncompensable regulation and compensable takings of property . . . .
Legitimately exercised, the police power requires no compensation.
Thus, if public use is truly coterminous with the police power, a state
could freely choose between compensation and noncompensation
anytime its actions served a “public use.” This approach would
seemingly overrule the entire takings doctrine in a single stroke. 155

The Court’s case law agrees with the conclusion drawn by Professor
Merrill. For example, traditional uses of the state’s police power, such as
the power to stop a public nuisance, required no compensation

152. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
153. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain
is merely the means to the end.”); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
154. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 162–81 (1985) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause was
designed to enable the government to condemn land for public uses, not to seize land to advance the
broadly defined public interest); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings
Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 939 (2003) (providing an overview of Takings Clause
literature); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1561, 1569 (1986) (“The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the requirement that the power of
eminent domain be devoted to public rather than private ends.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 891 (1987) (“The public use requirement traditionally meant that
property had actually to be used by the public. But gradually the requirement was expanded to refer
to any plausible justification.”(internal citations omitted)).
155. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70 (1986).
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whatsoever, 156 which is clearly contrary to the takings power, which has
always required compensation. 157 Therefore in Berman, for example, if
the slums to be removed were truly “blighted,” then state nuisance law
under the authority of the state’s police power, not eminent domain,
would have been the appropriate remedy. “The question whether the
State can take property using the power of eminent domain is therefore
distinct from the question whether it can regulate property pursuant to
the police power. To construe the Public Use Clause to overlap with the
States’ police power conflates these two categories.” 158
This obvious distinction between the police power and the eminent
domain power undercuts the rationale for applying rational basis review
in the public use context. Even Justice O’Connor recognized “the errant
language in [the majority opinion she authored in] . . . Midkiff.” 159 In
saying that “the ‘public use’ requirement was coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign’s police powers,” the Court “simply did not put such
language to the constitutional test.” 160
Although rational basis is typically applied when state action made
under the authority of the police power is judicially reviewed, it would
be illogical to apply rational basis to legislative determinations of public
use under the Takings Clause merely because the two state powers could
be used to solve an identical problem. There are situations in which a
deeper analysis must be taken to avoid problematic results inherent in
rational basis review of takings cases.
3. Inconsistencies in applying a rational basis review of takings
The Court’s application of rational basis review to legislative
determinations of a public use for the indirect benefits that may accrue
through economic development is inconsistent with the Court’s
precedent of applying higher scrutiny to protect fundamental property
interests. The Court would never “defer to a legislature’s determination
of the various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search

156. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887).
157. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 275 (1827); J. Madison, For the National
Property Gazette, (Mar. 27, 1792), in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267 (R. Rutland et al.
eds., 1983) (arguing that no property “shall be taken directly even for public use without
indemnification to the owner”).
158. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2685–86 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668–69).
159. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
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of a home would be reasonable.” 161 Yet the Kelo majority stresses the
importance of not “‘second-guess[ing] the City’s considered judgments’ .
. . when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the
infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down [an individual’s]
home[].” 162 Though the Court has adopted a “searching standard of
constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as
welfare benefits,” the Kelo majority contends that the Court ought to now
defer to the legislature’s determination of a public use for the purpose of
a taking, and “thereby invade[] individuals’ traditional rights in real
property.” 163 The Court’s overlapping application of deferential and
heightened scrutiny in regards to property interests highlights the irony
of the Kelo decision. This is not to suggest that any taking of private
property should be afforded heightened scrutiny; rather, it suggests that
when the only consideration given for the taking of private property is
the promise of future public benefits—and then only if and after a private
third party benefits—rational basis cannot be the default standard meant
to protect the “security of Property.” 164 The following sections provide
further insight on the inconsistencies that arise from an indiscriminate
application of rational basis review when applied to eminent domain
takings.
a. Inconsistency between federal and state rulings. Interestingly,
lower courts purporting to apply rational basis review sometimes find a
taking to be irrational for the same reasons that the Supreme Court would
uphold the taking. 165 Other courts interpret state public use provisions to

161. Id. at 2684 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980)).
162. Id. at 2685 (quoting the majority at 2668). Justice Thomas points out that, if we adopt the
majority’s viewpoint, then “[t]hough citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the
homes themselves are not.” Id.
163. Id. at 2684 (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
164. Hamilton, supra note 20.
165. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494 (Ark. 1967) (distinguishing
condemnations to eliminate blight where the transfer to private parties occurs “after the public
purpose was accomplished” and condemnations for economic development where the purpose is the
transfer to the private business); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10–
11 (Ill. 2002) (describing economic benefit as “trickle-down” effect); City of Owensboro v.
McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 6–7 (Ky. 1979) (“Every legitimate business . . . indirectly benefits the
public”); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 907–08 (Me. 1957) (fact that project may be
beneficial “in a broad sense” does not mean there is any direct public use); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856, 857 (S.C. 2003) (property may not be taken “on vague grounds
of public benefit to spring from a more profitable use”).
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require heightened scrutiny. 166 This resistance to the application of
rational basis review in public use cases suggests courts’ profound
discomfort with the logic of Midkiff and now Kelo.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court recently overruled its
earlier decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 167
with its decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock. 168 Hathcock held that
a generalized economic benefit to the public was not a public use
“simply because one entity’s profit maximization contributed to the
health of the general economy.” 169 Indeed, the court went to great
lengths to explicitly overrule the Poletown opinion, holding that
“Poletown’s conception of a public use—that of ‘alleviating
unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community’—
has no support in the Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence.” 170
Therefore, the condemnation of nonblighted land for an airport
technology park for economic development purposes was
unconstitutional. 171
Hathcock stands in stark contrast to the Court’s recent decision in
Kelo. Although the two state supreme courts came to different
conclusions on the adequacy of the proposed public use, both
condemnations would probably pass constitutional muster under the
relaxed, deferential rational basis standard of review the Supreme Court
used in Midkiff. 172 Neither public benefit is “impossible” or “palpably
without reasonable foundation”; 173 therefore, glancing over the
condemnation through a rational basis review would not uncover the
inadequacies of proposed public uses that could more easily be detected
through a heightened standard of review.
The Court could not have envisioned, let alone predicted, the extent
to which state and local governments would stretch the limits of Berman
and Midkiff to find a public use in the mere economic revitalization of
166. See Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 231 (Del.
1987) (holding that the primary purpose is determined by looking at the objective “consequences and
effects” of the taking); see also City of Jamestown v. Leevers, 552 N.W.2d 365, 372–74 (N.D. 1996)
(remanding for determination of primary purpose of condemnation and citing a heightened scrutiny
standard despite a finding of public use in general).
167. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
168. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
169. Id. at 786.
170. Id. at 787 (footnote omitted).
171. Id.
172. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citations omitted).
173. Id.
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perfectly viable stand-alone residential neighborhoods and businesses. In
both Kelo and Hathcock, the project area is blight-free. 174 There is no
other perceivable problem with the land, other than, in both cases, it
stands squarely in the path of government master plans. While the
Hathcock and Kelo opinions represent polar extremes on the sufficiency
of public use to support condemnation for the purpose of economic
revitalization, there are other egregious examples. 175
b. Inconsistency between different state court rulings. The Court’s
application of rational basis review to the Kelo decision provides no
further guidance to the lower courts than what they already had regarding
the appropriate level of judicial deference towards legislative uses of
eminent domain for the sole purpose of economic development. 176 In the
past, this lack of direction had allowed for numerous and conflicting
lower-court decisions. Indeed, nearly every state that had considered the
appropriate deference for a legislature’s determination of a public use
had devised its own test. For example, some state decisions explicitly
cited to the U.S. Constitution or federal cases, 177 some interpreted only

174. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004); Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d at 796.
175. For examples of state and federal courts (applying state law) finding sufficient public use,
see, for example, City of Shreveport v. Shreve Town Corp., 314 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that Shreveport’s condemnation of Shreve Town Corporation’s lot for the purpose of building a
parking lot for a new convention center presented an economic benefit to the community, and thus a
public purpose); J.C. Penney Corp. v. Carousel Ctr. Co., 306 F. Supp. 2d 274 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)
(finding that condemnation of plaintiff’s lease in a shopping center in order for the owner to
redevelop was not merely for private use); In re W. 41 St. Realty L.L.C. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (allowing the condemnation of land across Eighth
Ave. from the Port Authority Bus Terminal since benefit to the New York Times—including a new
headquarters, condos, subway entrance, auditorium, and gallery space—presented “an evident utility
[to] the public” (quoting Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 14 (N.Y. 1837));
Vitucci v. N.Y. City Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (upholding a
condemnation of a business for the purpose of constructing a new school as “further[ing] the public
benefit, utility, or advantage” despite the fact that the school was not built, and the defendants
instead chose to expand a neighboring food production business).
176. See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 593–95; Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768
N.E.2d 1, 8–9 (Ill. 2002).
177. See, e.g., Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n, 306 F.3d 445, 459 (7th Cir. 2002); Wilmington
Parking Auth. v. Land With Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 1986); Randolph v.
Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1958); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth.,
315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 7; Prince George’s County v.
Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278, 287 (Md. 1975); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City
of Detroit, 304 N.W. 455, 459 (Mich. 1981); City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214
(Mont. 1995); City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369, 374 (N.D.
1996).
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their state constitution, 178 and others cited to neither. 179 This confusion
was not, however, an example of healthy state experimentation. 180
Instead, this division in state court rulings demonstrated that lower courts
lacked guidance regarding the appropriate standard of deference to afford
a legislature’s determination of a public use taking. After Kelo, they still
lack that guidance.
There are two standards of rational review being employed at the
state level: one that actively seeks to validate legislative pronouncements
of “public use,” and one that digs just beneath the surface seeking what
Midkiff termed the “justifying public purpose.” 181 This variation creates
confusion, uncertainty, and unsettled expectations for litigants and the
public in general. Several cases illustrate the point that, as Kelo and
Hatchcock demonstrate, state and federal decisions don’t hew to any
bedrock principle when applying a rational basis review. Consider the
following examples.
In General Building Contractors, L.L.C. v. Board of Shawnee
County Comm’rs, 182 the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Joint
Economic Development Organization could condemn privately owned
land belonging to General Building Contractors, L.L.C. (GBC) and Mr.
Richard Tolbert for the purpose of economic development, specifically
the creation of an industrial park and a Target distribution center. 183
While GBC and Tolbert asserted that the taking did not meet the public
use test, the court countered by holding that “there is no precise
definition of what constitutes a valid public use, and what may be
178. City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 491 (Ark. 1967); City of Owensboro v.
McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1979); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 907 (Me. 1957);
Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 553 (Mass. 1969); Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d
216, 217 (N.H. 1985); Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 855 (S.C. 2003);
Petition of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 554 (Wash. 1981).
179. Gen. Bldg. Contractors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Shawnee County Comm’rs, 66 P.3d 873 (Kan.
2003); City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); Appeal of City of Keene, 693
A.2d 412 (N.H. 1997); In re Port of N.Y. Auth., 219 N.E.2d 797 (N.Y. 1966); Cannata v. City of
N.Y., 11 N.Y.2d 210 (N.Y. 1962).
180. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
(explaining that within the federal system, “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory[,] and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country”).
181. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Consol.
Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)); see also Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447 (1930);
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1905); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159 (1896)).
182. 66 P.3d 873 (Kan. 2003).
183. Id. at 875.
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considered a valid public use or purpose changes over time.” 184 Given
that the definition is so hard to pin down, the court noted that “as long as
a governmental action is designed to fulfill a public purpose, the wisdom
of the governmental action generally is not subject to review by the
courts.” 185 The court dismissed the potentially private nature of the
taking, stating that “[t]he mere fact that through the ultimate operation of
the law the possibility exists that some individual or private corporation
might make a profit does not, in and of itself, divest the act of its public
use and purpose.” 186
Contrast that decision with a U.S. District Court’s later decision in
99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency. 187 There the
court held that the City of Lancaster and the Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency’s condemnation of a store to accommodate the expansion of a
Costco did not demonstrate a public use since “the only reason
[Lancaster] enacted the Resolutions of Necessity was to satisfy the
private expansion demands of Costco.” 188 The redevelopment agency
argued that the prevention of “future blight” was also a motivating factor
behind the public purpose, but the court, unwilling to simply apply a
deferential blind eye, noted that this motivation was unsupported by any
authority or factual findings, and thereby was not a valid public
purpose. 189 These and several other cases exemplify why courts have
and will continue to apply various degrees of rational basis review to
disparate ends without a guiding bedrock standard for reviewing public
purpose takings. 190

184. Id. at 882.
185. Id. at 882 (quoting State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte County/Kansas
City, 962 P.2d 543, 553 (Kan. 1998) (citations omitted)).
186. Id. at 883.
187. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
188. Id. at 1129.
189. Id. at 1130.
190. See, e.g., Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that lack of evidence that a redevelopment project area was blighted required
invalidation of redevelopment plans); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes
Redevelopment Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 362 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (overturning trial
court’s determination that the administrative record supported Town’s finding that the Project Area
was blighted); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (holding that
SWIDA did not have the authority to take property from NCE and convey it to Gateway
International Motorsports for more parking space); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727
A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) ( invalidating a taking by a casino and holding that it
was analogous to giving the developer a blank check with respect to future development on the
property for casino hotel purposes).
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The Supreme Court must go beyond rational basis scrutiny for
takings that result in, if anything, indirect benefits to the public. The
Court must also acknowledge that merely conceivable reasons are
insufficient for upholding a taking that ought to have clearly established
reasons when private property is taken with only the potential for future
public benefits. By recognizing that the police power is not synonymous
with rational basis review, the Court can correct the current problems
inherent in applying a deferential standard to legislative determinations
of what constitutes a public use under the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, namely inconsistency, confusion, and vagueness. By
applying the appropriate standard, one that already exists and is currently
utilized in the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Court has the
opportunity to clear up the confusion in the lower courts and provide
protection for the security of property.
B. Intermediate-Level Scrutiny for Takings
Resulting in Indirect Public Benefit
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, rational basis review as
presently conducted by state courts (and federal courts applying state
standards) leads to conflicting and unsatisfactory results in the realm of
government taking for a public use. Often, the exercise of eminent
domain is upheld through a vaguely articulated public use, the benefits of
which accrue most specifically and directly to private owners. In a few
instances, even after applying a rational basis review, courts find the
taking lacks any “public use.” The difference between these cases’
outcomes holds the key to why, in cases involving public benefit takings,
courts should apply a more searching standard of review.
In some cases, the taking of private property for private use is simply
too egregious to condone. To suggest even to the common layperson that
private property could be taken for use by another private entity would
likely elicit reactions of disgust at the injustice. 191 While the argument
has been made for applying strict scrutiny to eminent domain
proceedings, 192 “hands-off” rational basis scrutiny generally is justified
191. This idea is analogized from what has been referred to as a type of constitutional “gag
reflex.” See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. REV. 995.
192. See Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
Analysis under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 286,
307–11 (2000) (arguing that property rights should be granted fundamental status as part of the
privacy penumbra described in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and thus be subject to
strict scrutiny).
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by the need to guarantee that the legislature, not the courts, determines
which policies to pursue. 193 But heightened judicial scrutiny of the
exercise of eminent domain would not limit the range of policies
available to government. Rather, a more searching inquiry in public use
cases merely would serve to draw a line between the legislature’s ability
to determine social policy and the judiciary’s ability to protect the
security of property.
Takings with indirect public benefits must undergo heightened
scrutiny to ensure protection of private property interests. There must be
a higher standard of review to ensure that the government taking in these
situations “substantially advances” the government’s purpose in
achieving the desired end—public benefit. 194 By applying a bright-line
test analogized from the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,
namely the qualitative/quantitative nexus test, the court can establish a
rebuttable presumption against the use of eminent domain for public
purpose takings when the benefits from the taking are not immediately
clear. Such a rule would provide the appropriate check on the
legislature’s power of eminent domain in fulfillment of the judiciary’s
constitutional role.
1. Rebuttable presumption against eminent domain for public purpose
takings
When declaring a taking to be a public use under the Takings Clause,
the government would always start from the assumption that if the taking
will directly result in public benefits (a road, a hospital, etc.), it will be
afforded deference under a rational basis review of the taking. However,
if the government wishes to cross from that established threshold by
executing a taking through eminent domain that would only indirectly
achieve a public benefit through a private third party (economic
development, etc.), the government would have to overcome a rebuttable
presumption that the taking is not for a public use sufficient to satisfy the
Fifth Amendment. 195 The government, by showing evidence of both a

193. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984).
194. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 (2005).
195. See also Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice Zarella actually proposes a four-step
analysis in which the burden of proof is shifted between the respective parties at various stages in the
analysis. Those steps include the following: (1) The party opposing the taking has the burden of
proving whether the statutory scheme is facially constitutional. (2) If the proposed economic
development is a valid public use sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, then the party opposing
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qualitative and quantitative nexus between the government’s purpose for
and the scope of the taking, would be able to overcome that presumption,
satisfy heightened scrutiny, and bridge the gap between takings with
direct and indirect benefits (over the aforementioned “New London
Bridge”).
2. The bright-line rule: a regulatory takings test for public-purpose
takings
Courts should, and a few do, examine cases of eminent domain with
more care than the rational basis test provides. The concept of applying a
higher standard of review to takings cases that do not directly achieve the
purpose of the taking is not new; on the contrary, it is a well-established
principle of takings jurisprudence. In dealing with regulatory takings, the
Court has established a means-oriented test capable of resolving the issue
of whether a taking truly accomplishes its purpose. Simply applying that
standard as a bright-line rule to takings with indirect benefits would
establish a clear test against which courts could standardize and
normalize these decisions.
Applying a higher standard of review to public use determinations
demands, like substantive scrutiny of economic regulations, an inquiry
into the appropriate ends of government action. Once the legislature has
declared a taking to be for a “public use,” assuming the public use would
result in indirect public benefits, the court would not accept the
legislature’s determination; rather, under a higher standard of review, the
court would ask whether the economic development is a “public use” or
“in the public interest.”
While this initial inquiry does call for a look into the ends proposed
by the legislature, the test for such a legislative determination would
focus instead on whether eminent domain is the appropriate means by
which a government may pursue desired policies. Therefore, the court
would analyze both the means and the ends to ensure that the taking is
the taking bears the additional burden of proving, in accordance with the deferential standard of
review, that the primary intent of the particular economic plan in to benefit private, rather than
public, interests. (3) If the taking party survives that step, they then bear the burden to prove that the
specific economic development will, in fact, result in a public benefit by clear and convincing
evidence. (4) Finally, if the taking party meets this burden, the party opposing the taking must, again
under the deferential standard afforded the legislature, prove that the specific condemnation at issue
is not reasonably necessary to implement the plan. Id. at 587–91. However, it seems as though the
first step is a given argument that a party opposing the taking would make. Furthermore, requiring a
demonstration of an essential nexus and a rough proportionality between the government’s plan and
the plan for the taking accomplishes the remaining three steps.
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substantially related to an important and verifiably attainable goal. This
means-oriented test for eminent domain can be found in the regulatory
takings context, illustrated by the holdings in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission 196 and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 197 Nollan and
Dollan demonstrate the need to find a qualitative and a quantitative
nexus between the taking and its purpose.
a. The qualitative nexus: the essential nexus between the taking and
the indirect public benefit. The government must show that its purpose
behind the taking is substantially related to the proposed taking in order
to demonstrate a qualitative nexus. In Nollan, the California Coastal
Commission granted a permit to the Nollans to replace a small bungalow
on their beachfront lot with a larger house, but conditioned that permit on
allowing a public easement to pass across their property such that people
walking past their home could see and access the beach.
Justice Scalia explained the importance of identifying the “essential
nexus” between the government’s purpose and the regulation. 198 If the
regulation merely had been a standard regulation to impose an easement
for public beach access on the land of whoever built a home along the
seashore property, the regulation would have been a taking and the
government would have been obligated to pay just compensation. The
“evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition
substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as
the justification for the prohibition.” 199 The lack of a nexus between a
condition imposed by the regulation and the original purpose of the
building restriction “converts that purpose to something other than what
it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an
easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation.” 200 In short, the purpose becomes what
Justice Scalia called “an out-and-out plan of extortion.” 201 Thus, this
qualitative nexus ensures that the purpose meets the regulation.
Although this holding relates specifically to regulatory takings, its
analogous importance to eminent domain is clear: the judiciary, while
deferential to the legislature’s ability to pronounce a taking as providing

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836–37.
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for a “public use,” must analyze the qualitative nexus between the
government’s purpose in the taking and the taking itself to ensure
fairness and justice. This nexus concerns the qualitative nature of the
taking: does the government’s purpose for the taking meet with the
taking itself?
For example, in Berman, Congress made a “‘legislative
determination’” that “‘conditions existing in the District of Columbia
with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use
of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare,’” and declared that the
policy of the United States was to “‘eliminat[e] all such injurious
conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the
purpose.’” 202 The city knew the exact boundaries of the blighted area
and developed a plan to revitalize that exact area.
The Act passed by Congress empowered the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency to acquire the lands through eminent
domain or otherwise. 203 The Agency initiated eminent domain
proceedings against the properties in question. However, there were no
additional requirements placed on the residents, and the Agency did not
go outside of its authority to acquire any other lands other than those
considered “substandard housing and blighted areas.” 204 Had the Agency
not remained within the scope of their charter and proposed an additional
component to the taking—requiring for example, parcels of land from
adjoining neighborhoods for a new park in order to further beautify the
area 205 —that would have exceeded the scope of the taking’s purpose and
been invalid.
Similarly, in Midkiff, the purpose of the taking was to open the fee
simple market to competitive market forces by divesting ownership of
forty-seven percent of the state’s land from seventy-two private
landowners. 206 Any proposed taking outside of that scope would have
been invalid. The Hawaii legislature had considered requiring the large
landowners to sell the lands that they were leasing to homeowners. The
landowners strongly resisted this scheme, however, pointing to the
202. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954) (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790, D.C. CODE § 2 (1951)).
203. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790, D.C. CODE, §§ 5-701 to
5-719.
204. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
205. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
206. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
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significant federal tax liabilities they would incur. Therefore, the
legislature created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for
transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees.
By condemning the land in question, the Hawaii Legislature made the
land sales involuntary, thereby making the federal tax consequences less
severe while still facilitating the redistribution of fees simple. 207 Had the
state legislature instituted proceedings to force the sale of the land to the
lessors through another mechanism, thereby transferring property to the
lessees but also inducing large tax penalties for the lessors, this taking
would have exceeded the essential nexus between the purpose behind the
government’s taking and the need for the taking.
b. The quantitative nexus: a rough proportionality between the
taking and the indirect public benefit. Complimenting the Nollan
decision is the Court’s ruling in Dolan v. City of Tigard, which requires a
“rough proportionality” between the taking imposed by the state and the
state’s goals, “both in nature and extent.” 208 In Dolan, an Oregon city
refused to grant approval for a building permit to expand a hardware
store located on a flood plane unless the owner dedicated certain portions
of the property to flood control measures, traffic improvements, and a
bike path. 209 The court of appeals approved the ruling of the Land Use
Board requiring these exactions, but the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded. Justice Rehnquist explained that in Dolan, the first step
(required by Nollan), was satisfied. There were “no such gimmicks . . .
associated with the permit conditions imposed by the city,” as had been
the case in Nollan, because there was obviously a nexus between the
need for the regulation—“prevention of flooding . . . and the reduction of
traffic congestion”—and the regulation exactions. 210
The city, however, demanded more than was necessary to
accomplish its purpose. The city not only wanted Ms. Dolan not to build
in the floodplain but also wanted her property “along Fanno Creek for its
greenway system. The city [had] never said why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood

207. To accommodate the needs of both lessors and lessees, the Hawaii Legislature enacted
the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act), HAW. REV. STAT. § 516 (1967).
208. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 387.
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control.” 211 The purpose met the regulation, but the city’s required
exaction was more than the regulation needed.
Furthermore, the lower state courts in Dolan had been similarly
divided on the appropriate standard of review for such regulatory
exactions. The Court considered the various state court tests for
reviewing exactions and concluded that the test that most closely
approximated the correct federal standard required “the municipality to
show a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the required dedication and the
impact of the proposed development.” 212 The Court expressed concern,
however, that the phrase “reasonable relationship” might be confused
with the more lax rational basis review and chose instead to impose the
“rough proportionality” standard as its approximate equivalent. 213 This
quantitative nexus formula does not mean that a “precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” 214
This inquiry, applied to takings, would continue to reflect the
prevailing view that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is better
able to determine which projects are in the public’s interest. It would
reject, however, the conclusion that the court need only satisfy itself that
“the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose.” 215 Instead, the courts would ask the
government to demonstrate that the exercise of eminent domain is
substantially related to the important end for which it was employed.
This test would fit easily into standard eminent domain procedures.
The established procedures for taking property simplify means-ends
analysis by traditionally requiring that the public either (1) subsequently
own the property taken, or (2) has full use of the property. In Kelo, the
purpose justifying the taking, namely economic development, is the
“ends” portion of the public use equation, just as the “impact of the
proposed development” is used for rough proportionality review of
exactions. 216

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citations omitted).
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
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The government should be required to make some sort of
individualized determination of the need for the particular parcel in
question before condemning private property. At a bare minimum,
a condemnor should be expected to establish that the public at large
will be benefited by the exercise of eminent domain and that less
intrusive means of acquiring property are not availing. Generalized
statements as to the necessity for a taking, sometimes veering toward
mere speculation, should not be regarded as adequate. 217

C. Application to Kelo
When the facts of Kelo are viewed under the light of heightened
scrutiny, the government fails to justify the taking. There is no nexus
between the government’s purpose in the taking—to redevelop the
property, increasing tax revenue and available jobs, thereby helping
revitalize the city—and the actual taking.
There is no such assurance sufficient to prove a qualitative nexus in
Kelo. The fundamental problem with economic development of a city
that has been legislatively designated economically distressed 218 is that
there are no boundaries by which to limit the prospective taking. The
NLDC has authority to acquire the Fort Trumbull properties at issue in
Kelo for economic development reasons, but there is no indication in the
record or the case that developing this particular area will benefit the city
any more than another private residential area. Referring again to Nollan,
there was no essential nexus in that case because the regulatory taking
did not match the purpose of the taking. However, in Kelo, since the
entire town is economically depressed, and the stated purpose is for
economic development, not only are there no limitations to the potential
scope of the takings, there is no way to know if the takings fit the scope
of that purpose. The NLDC could easily condemn any property for any
purpose in any part of the city’s limits in the name of economic
development because the entire town is economically distressed.
There was no evidence at the trial court level of a rough
proportionality between what is being taken and what is being received
in its place. Justice Zarella, in his dissenting opinion at the Connecticut
217. James W. Ely, Jr., Can the Despotic Power be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain, A.B.A. PROBATE & PROP. (Nov./Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2003/nd/ely.html.
218. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005) (designating the city of New
London a “distressed municipality.”).
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Supreme Court cited evidence presented to the trial court to indicate that
even viewing future events in the light most beneficial to the state, there
is little evidence that the public benefit would actually be achieved. To
the contrary, the evidence “establishe[d] that . . . there was no signed
agreement to develop the properties” with set terms, 219 “the economic
climate was poor and the development plan contained no conditions
pertaining to future development agreements that would ensure
achievement of the intended public benefit if development were to
occur.” 220
By leasing the land for $1 per year for ninety-nine years, the city is
locked into a long-term commitment to a single developer, who is now in
a “position to reap substantial financial rewards without a corresponding
penalty if the developer did not perform as expected.” 221 Additionally,
there is little to no demand for the office space that is being created. 222
“Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the expected public investment
in the project area” was “close to $80 million.” 223 The ceiling for a
potential increase in annual tax revenue was $680,544 to $1,249,843. 224

219. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 596 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in
part dissenting in part). To better understand the importance of having a signed development
agreement with the selected developer prior to the taking, Justice Zarella offers the following
hypothetical example:
Six months after the takings are completed, an interested developer is located. The
developer contends that the economic conditions of the town and region are such that the
project is not economically feasible unless the development agreement requires the town
and the taking authority to do the following: (1) remediate the environmental conditions
affecting the property, (2) replace the road and utility infrastructure, and (3) take
measures to reduce the risk of coastal flooding, all at a cost of more than $70 million.
Additionally, the developer insists that the town abate property taxes on the development
for a period of years and, rather than require the developer to purchase the improved
property at fair market value, enter into an agreement with the developer to lease the
property for ninety-nine years for the sum of $1 per year. Furthermore, the developer
agrees to commence construction only after he is able to find viable tenants for the
property or when a particular economic index for the area indicates demand for the uses,
such as when the vacancy rate for class A office space drops below a certain level.
As I understand the majority’s view, after according deference to the taking
authority, the takings in the above scenario, which occur six months before any of the
terms of the development agreement are known, would withstand a challenge by property
owners who wish to remain in their homes.
Id. at 601–02.
220. Id. at 596.
221. Id. at 597.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 598.
224. Id.
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At its best, this can “hardly . . . be considered a major financial benefit to
the public.” 225
Similarly, the record contained no evidence that the indirect benefits
given as reasons for why this taking was a “public use,” “namely, spinoff economic activities and between 500 and 940 indirect new jobs,”
would ever be realized. 226 Furthermore, there was no “evidence as to
when in the next thirty years such benefits might be realized.” 227
Kelo would not have survived a heightened scrutiny review based on
an qualitative/quantitative test analogized from the Court’s own
regulatory takings jurisprudence. In fact, Kelo would not have survived a
rational basis review under the jurisprudence of several states in which
the courts review, at the very least, whether proposed economic
development will, in fact, occur. 228 The only chance Kelo had of
surviving was under a completely deferential standard of review to the
legislative pronouncement of its “public use,” regardless of outcome or
future precedent.
The Kelo majority, including Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, “put[]
special emphasis on the facts peculiar to this case.” 229 Key among them
was that the NLDC’s plan was a product of careful deliberation, it

225. Id.
226. Id. at 599.
227. Id.
228. See Walker v. Shasta Power Co., 160 F. 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1908) (noting that a
corporation’s right of eminent domain is not tested solely by description of public uses and private
purposes contained in articles of incorporation, but may be determined “by evidence . . . showing the
actual purpose in view”); Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353 (Conn. 1886); Linggi v.
Garovotti, 286 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1955) (noting that a private party authorized by statute to acquire
easement by eminent domain for sewer connection to existing public sewer system must make strong
evidentiary showing establishing that taking will benefit public); Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert,
88 A. 633 (Conn. 1913); Wilton v. St. Johns County, 123 So. 527, 534 (Fla. 1929) (“[C]ourts have
the ultimate power and duty to determine . . . whether [condemnation in any given case] is in fact for
a public or a private use.”); Brown v. Gerald, 61 A. 785, 788 (Me. 1905) (noting that actual purpose
of taking authorized by power company’s charter was “open to judicial inquiry”); Kirkwood v.
Venable, 173 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1943) (stating that inasmuch as evidence indicated that condemned
property was needed for public park, was suitable for public park and would be used by city for
public park, court determined that condemnation was for public use); Kansas City v. Liebi, 252 S.W.
404 (Mo. 1923) (stating that evidence established that protective ordinance restricting use of and
condemning rights to property would prevent overcrowding and make city more attractive, thereby
promoting health, general welfare, growth and general prosperity of city, and that considerable part
of community would actually use or benefit from contemplated improvement); Charlotte v. Heath,
40 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. 1946) (noting that evidence established that intended use of right of way
allowing property owners living outside city limits to connect to sewer lines would be public); State
ex rel. Harlan v. Centralia-Chehalis Elec. Ry. & Power Co., 85 P. 344 (Wash. 1906).
229. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2676 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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proposed to use eminent domain as part of an integrated plan instead of
merely an isolated property transfer, it promised several incidental
benefits including aesthetic improvements in addition to mere increased
tax revenue, and it was in response to a “legislative determination that
New London is a depressed municipality.” 230
All of these facts helped establish that the development plan was not
intended primarily to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other
private entity 231 but, “rather, to revitalize the local economy by creating
temporary and permanent jobs, generating a significant increase in tax
revenue, encouraging spin-off economic activities and maximizing
public access to the waterfront.” 232 However, that fact alone is
insufficient to determine whether the transfer of property from one
private entity to another satisfies the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, nor is it of any precedential worth. As Justice O’Connor
explained:
If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a
new use can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the Court’s rule or
in Justice Kennedy’s gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers
generated with less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to
result from less elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is
the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an already
prosperous city into an even more prosperous one. 233

The conclusion that the development plan was intended primarily to
benefit the public, per se, is insufficient to justify the takings. 234

230. Id.
231. In all fairness, the city had begun plans for redevelopment of the area before Pfizer, Inc.
approached the city regarding construction of their research facility. Furthermore, while the city
intended to transfer certain of the parcels to a private developer in a long-term lease, which
developer, in turn, was expected to lease the office space and so forth to other private tenants, the
identities of which not being known when the plan was adopted. As the Court stated, “[i]t is, of
course, difficult to accuse the government of having taken A’s property to benefit the private
interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.” Id. at 2662 n.6.
232. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 n.6 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 595
(Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
233. Id. at 2676–77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
234. See supra Part IV.B.3 discussing the qualitative and quantitative requirements of the
Nollan/Dolan test.
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V. CONCLUSION
Kelo v. City of New London is the broadest expansion of eminent
domain power in this nation’s history. Ironically, the broadest expansion
was accomplished with the least amount of work. Since the Court
allowed rational basis scrutiny to remain the standard, even in cases
clearly distinguishable from precedent by the indirect nature of their
results, the “specter of condemnation hangs over all property.” 235
Although the majority ignored it, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
discounted it, no legal limitation to eminent domain power prevents a
state from “replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a
shopping mall, . . . any farm with a factory,” 236 any church with a
Costco, 237 or any home with a parking lot. 238 Rehearing on this case has
been denied, 239 but the issue is far from settled. The Supreme Court
should revisit this precedent and apply a heightened scrutiny in order to
ensure the protection and the security of property.
Trent Christensen

235. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
236. Id.; see, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.Supp.2d
1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing an attempted taking of 99 Cents store to replace with a Costco);
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (taking a working-class,
immigrant community in Detroit and giving it to a General Motors assembly plant), overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004); cf. Bugryn v. City of Bristol, 774 A.2d
1042 (2001) (taking the homes and farm of four owners in their seventies and eightees and giving it
to an “industrial park”).
237. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1225 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
238. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at
36, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108)).
239. Kelo v. City of New London, 126 S. Ct. 24 (2005).
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